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. In the first nine months of 2016, this number was of 300,000 2 . 3 International Organizations claim that this situation has become a social, humanitarian and political crisis without precedent in the recent history of the European Union 3 . 4 Migratory, commercial and cultural contact among African, Asian, Middle Eastern and European territories through the Mediterranean is a centuries old phenomenon, but at least three important characteristics of the current situation have reshaped these past patterns of mobility. (Frontex) states that the number of migrants and refugees has increased around 400% in 2015, in comparison with the previous year's figures. In July 2015, migrants numbered 107,500 persons: an amount three times superior to that of July 2014, making it a record high since Frontex
Firstly, there has been an undeniable surge in the number of non-European migrants arriving at Southern European borders. The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
The Mediterranean "crisis": the European images of otherness and the postglobalization realism started registering this data 4 . This diversification of both routes and countries of origin has had a deep impact in the patterns of interaction between migrants and hosts societies. The Greek, Italian, Maltese, and Spanish port cities (that have become the "border territories" of these routes) are social spaces in which identity negotiation processes take place (often leading to conflictive situations). It is possible to identify the existence of longue durée 89 imaginaries regarding the Southern waters of the Mediterranean Sea as a limit between "European civilization" and its archetypal counterpart: the "others". This imaginary could also be tracked in the labeling of Spain and Italy's most Southern cities as "underdeveloped" localities in their own countries hegemonic representations. Edward Said 9 10 addresses this analysis. Following Gramsci 10 , 11 he explains how the relationship between Northern Italian cities and Southern Sicilian islands reproduces on a national scale the relation of otherness that Europe (as an imagined community) creates with its Southern borders territories in the Mediterranean.
These non-European others are generically represented as belonging to "other religions" (as "non Christian people"). Whenever they express any intense religious ties, beliefs or practices, these are usually understood as a mark of otherness, since secularism or a disenchanted assumption of the world -as in Weber . These "others" are also seen as acting according to strange (or exotic) social habits and ethics, and expressing an ethnic affiliation that is often interpreted in connection to their alleged phenotypical differences. Therefore, these otherness imaginaries are still mobilizing images of racial difference which include the rise of xenophobic and racist opposition to the arrival of migrants and asylum seekers in the Southern European borders.
Both images (of an archetypical Europeanness and of its alleged counterpart) derive from the long-term processes of invention of a "pan-European" identity. Even agreeing with Anderson 13 , 14 who connected the generation of social identity with the origin of Nation States in the continent, it is central to distend that perception in order to avoid methodological nationalisms 14 , 15 and to assume the importance of religion in the shaping of European processes of otherness, especially in border regions. In this sense, and following Hastings 15 , 16 it should be stressed that the religious imaginaries were raised long before the emergence of Nation States, and centrally influenced the latter by connecting them with past practices and performances of identity. In many aspects, the arrival of migrants and refugees in Mediterranean port cities builds local scenarios of intense cultural and religious diversification, including the presence of Muslims, Jews, Hindus, Catholics, Protestants, and believers in Native African religions, among others.
Furthermore, this human migration has great potential in transnationalising religion 16 , 17 generating ties between origin and host societies, and creating diversified religious enclaves in Mediterranean localities. Although the specific encounter between host societies and these new migrants/refugees can assume different forms, it is currently acquiring the shape of an identity crisis, motivating politics that overlap interests, that include "heterogeneous or hybrid publics", challenging "conventional notions of belonging, identity and citizenship"
17
. 18 This situation leads migrants and autochthones to ask some key questions regarding the cultural encounter: "Can we ever peacefully live with one another? What do we share collectively as human beings?" 18 .
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But a third point must be addressed. The phenomenon can also be stated as a humanitarian crisis due to the intensification and spread of the violence and danger that accompany different moments of the migrants' itineraries up to their arrival in Mediterranean port cities. There has been an intensification of the role carried out by criminal transnational human trafficking organisations in transporting migrants, sometimes including long journeys that imply desert crossings or lengthy walking trips. At the same time, the change in the management -is the opposite of what is expected by public managers: there has been no reduction in the numbers who attempt to migrate, but an increase in the number of persons that die during the journey. UNHCR 22 22 identified the Mediterranean Sea routes as the most dangerous in the world for migrants and refugees. Furthermore, many of those travelling are escaping from territories at war, trying to evade violence and religious persecution. On their arrival, they are moved to "detention camps" or "holding centres", where they could wait a long time for judicial decisions regarding their asylum cases or deportation 23 . 23 Therefore, the crisis must be read from another perspective: one that is deeply connected to the changes in the international politics regarding the human mobilities. Since 2001, we have entered a new phase in the governance of international migration. The last two decades of the 20 th century were generically designated "the age of migration" by social scientists 24 . 24 As many researchers stress, this expression is not related to a quantitative change in the percentage of international migrants in that period. Rather, it summarizes the contradictions of globalization regarding the production of representations on transnational and transborder mobility. Beyond the varied meanings attributed to the "age of migration", the fact is that it has come to an (unhappy) end, giving rise to the beginning of an "age of migration crisis". The transition between these "ages" entails a change in the production of globally shared imaginaries about migration: from a discourse that celebrated (very contradictorily) cross-border and transnational mobility, to one that speaks of it, openly, as an evil to be persecuted and eradicated. Although this transition has been taking place for at least 15 years or more, its imprint was radicalized in 2016 due to a set of global political outcomes. Since then, a conservative, xenophobic and racist twist in international migration governance has been consolidated, Trump's discourse being a clear example of the above. However, this change is part of a more complex picture, articulated by the radicalization of neoliberalism, by the lack (or active destruction) of alternative models, and by the consolidation of a capitalist realism that disavows humanist values and counter-hegemonic worldviews 25 . 25 It is hard to relate the Global North's current political agenda on migrant issues to any humanitarian rationale. Postglobalization configures a scenario in which the migrant condition -especially when experienced by populations from peripherical countries-has become a fundamental part of the fragmentation processes of advanced capitalism. Furthermore, migrants are increasingly being used to sustain a generalized fear of "external enemies" that has economic purposes: it justifies the increase of State investments in the war industry (which happens to be the most important economic niche in the US and many European Countries). This discursive use of fear is based on bringing together nationalist sentiments that are easily manipulated politically: an outcome we observed in 2016 in the United States' presidential election campaign, and in the vote for Brexit in UK. In the European Union, we have seen it repeatedly in the reaffirmation of the restrictive policies applied to Syrian refugees. The imaginaries of fear and rejection of cultural difference are getting progressively stronger, and the claims for "renationalization" of borders, economics and politics are becoming hegemonic ideas. The metaphor of these ideological outputs is the emergence of a renewed interest in materializing the national barriers through literal walls. Trump's proposal regarding the Mexico-US border is the clearest example of the latter. Postglobalization seems to be, as the Cold War was, another "Era of Walls".
Shortly before his death, Bauman 26 26 stated that all these events must be read from a specific political context: as part of a deep crisis in the global neoliberal economy, which is proving to be incapable of restoring itself after its cyclical breakdowns. Simultaneously, they are also related to the inability of democratic regimes to reconcile their structural legal principles with the intensification of the neoliberal models of accumulation 27 . 27 said two decades ago, the nationalist rejection of "the others" is "a substitute for factors of integration in a society that is disintegrating. When society fails, the nation appears as the ultimate guarantee"
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. 28 Denominating this new postglobal scenario as immersed in a "migration and/or refugee crisis" is part of the problem 29 : 29 it fosters the production of hate for minorities as an escape valve that relieves the prevailing tension, but at the price of reproducing and materializing it in a specific rejection of certain social groups 30 . 30 The "crisis" is related to the mode of production, and its increasingly conflicting relationship with the forms of political institutions that are minimally necessary for the existence of democratic regimes.
